Initial corporate
governance developments in the UK began in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
the wake of corporate scandals such as Polly Peck and Maxwell. Financial
reporting irregularities led to the establishment of the ‘Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance Committee’ led by Sir Adrian Cadbury. The resulting Cadbury Report published in 1992 outlined a number of recommendations
around the separation of the role of an organisation’s chief executive and
chairman, balanced composition of the board, selection processes for
non-executive directors, transparency of financial reporting and the need for
good internal controls. The Cadbury Report included a Code of Best Practice and
its recommendations were incorporated into the Listing Rules of the London
Stock Exchange.
Following Cadbury, a
‘Working Group on Internal Control’ was established to provide guidance to
companies on how to comply with Principle 4.5 of the Cadbury Code ‘reporting on
the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal control’. This led to the
publication of the Rutteman Report in 1994 on ‘Internal
Control and Financial Reporting’.
In 1995, following
concerns about directors’ pay and share options, the Greenbury Report recommended extensive
disclosure in annual reports on remuneration and recommended the establishment
of a remuneration committee comprised of non-executive directors. Again, the
majority of the recommendations were endorsed by the Listing Rules.
In January 1996, the
Hampel Committee was established to review the extent to which the
Cadbury and Greenbury Reports had been implemented and whether the objectives
had been met. The Hampel Report led to the publication of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance
(1998) covering areas relating
to structure and operations of the board, directors’ remuneration,
accountability and audit, relations with institutional shareholders, and the
responsibilities of institutional shareholders.
The 1998 Combined Code
applied to all listed companies from 31 December 1998 until reporting years
commencing on or after 1 November 2003 until it was superseded by the revised
Code in 2003. It was appended to Listing Rule 12.43A requiring companies to
provide in their annual reports a narrative statement of how they have applied
the Code principles and state that they have complied with the Code provisions
or, if not, why not and for what period.
Part of the 1998 and
2003 Combined Codes required companies to provide a statement in their annual
report on how they have applied the Code Principle and Code Provisions relating
to internal control. Guidance for companies on how this should be approached
was needed. This led to the establishment of the Turnbull Committee in 1998 by
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) which
then resulted in the Turnbull Guidance, “Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on
the Combined Code” published in September 1999. The Guidance is a
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) approved framework for management to
show that they have adequate internal control structures and financial
reporting procedures in place in order to comply with section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In 2001, the
relationship between institutional investors and companies was addressed with
the Government commissioned Myners Review, ‘Institutional Investment in the UK’. The objective of
the review was ‘to consider whether there were factors distorting the
investment decision-making of institutions’. It included suggestions for the
improvement of communication between investors and companies and encouraged
institutional investors to consider their responsibilities as owners and how
they should exercise their rights on behalf of beneficiaries.
In 2002, the Directors’
Remuneration Report Regulations were introduced to further
strengthen the powers of shareholders in relation to directors’ pay. The
regulations increased the amount of information shareholders are given on
directors’ remuneration, certain disclosures, as well as performance graphs.
Shareholder may vote in an advisory capacity to approve the directors’
remuneration report.
In July 2002, the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and HM Treasury instigated a review of
the Combined Code following a review of company law. It initiated the Higgs Report on “The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors” which
was published in January 2003. Recommendations from Higgs included a definition
of ‘independence’ and the proportion of independent non-executive directors on
the board and its committees; an expansion on the role of the senior
independent director to provide an alternative channel to shareholders and lead
evaluations on the chairman’s performance; added emphasis on the process of
nominations to the board through a transparent and rigorous process and
evaluation of the performance of the board, its committees and individual
directors.
Around the same time,
the Financial Reporting Council published the Smith Report, “Guidance on Audit Committees”. Both the Higgs and Smith
Reports were published in January 2003 followed by the Tyson Report on the recruitment and development of non-executive
directors commissioned by the DTI. The recommendations from the Higgs and Smith
Reports led to changes in the Combined Code of Corporate Governance
published in July 2003. It applied to all
companies listed on the primary market of the London Stock Exchange for
reporting years commencing on or after 1 November 2003.
In 2004, the Financial
Reporting Council established the Turnbull Review Group to consider the impact
of ‘Internal control: Guidance for Directors on the
Combined Code’ and to determine whether
the guidance needed to be updated. Accordingly, “Internal Control: Revised Guidance for
Directors on the Combined Code” was published by the Financial
Reporting Council in October 2005.
In 1998, the UK
Government instigated a Company Law Review and produced a White Paper in 2002.
A number of proposals in the White Paper related to company reporting and a
significant development was the requirement for companies to provide a
mandatory Operating and
Financial Review to provide
information on the company’s current and prospective performance and strategy.
This came into effect from financial years beginning on or after 1 April 2005.
The European Union also
significantly influences corporate governance in the UK. The European Commission’s
“Corporate
Governance and Company Law Action Plan” (May 2003) proposed a mix of legislative and regulatory measures
which would affect all member States relating to:
·
disclosure
requirements;
·
exercise of
voting rights;
·
cross-
border voting;
·
disclosure
by institutional investors; and
·
responsibilities
of board members.
The
Enron scandal in 2001 eventually
led to the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation, and the dissolution of Arthur
Andersen, one of the five largest audit and accountancy firms in the
world. In addition to being the largest
bankruptcy reorganisation in American history at that time, Enron undoubtedly
was the biggest audit failure. As a
consequence of the Enron scandal in 2001, new regulations and legislation were
enacted to expand the reliability of financial reporting for public companies.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
introduced in 2002 to increase the accountability of auditing firms to remain
objective and independent of their clients. Seven years since Enron placed corporate governance under the spotlight, the recent global financial crisis has renewed that focus. Deficiencies and failures in corporate governance in the new Millennium have led to the new financial crisis starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 followed by several UK and European Banking Groups. These events have confirmed that the soaring pay packages for top bank executives were driven by extraordinary risk-taking rather than real sustainable profits.
The economic crisis has prompted governments across the world to re-evaluate their financial regulatory framework, to try to tackle the causes of, and fallout from, the global downturn. The UK Government has taken unprecedented action to prevent and contain future crises in the financial markets and support the broader economy focusing on stabilising the banking system to protect people’s savings and the economy.
The global financial crisis has revealed widespread and massive failures in risk management practices. Many economists, organisations and governments have suggested a link between weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements which did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of financial service companies.
The UK Government commissioned Lord Turner in October 2008 to review the causes of the global financial crisis. The Turner Review, issued in March 2009, was a UK regulatory response to the global banking crisis. The Turner Review outlines recommendations on the redesign of regulation and supervisory approach needed to create a more robust banking system for the future. The Review also focuses on the improvements in the effectiveness of internal risk management and corporate governance.
In February 2009 Sir David Walker, ex-City regulator had been asked by the Prime Minister to review corporate governance in UK banks in the light of the experience of critical loss and failure throughout the banking system. The Walker Review published in November 2009 recommends more transparent pay and bonus structures for all high earners following a serious and ongoing corporate governance failings in the financial sector.
The review
examines corporate governance in the UK banking industry and makes
recommendations on:
·
the effectiveness of risk
management at board level, including the incentives in remuneration policy to
manage risk effectively;
·
the balance of skills,
experience and independence required on the boards of UK banking institutions;
·
the effectiveness of board
practices and the performance of audit, risk, remuneration and nomination
committees;
·
the role of institutional
shareholders in engaging effectively with companies and monitoring boards; and
·
whether the UK approach is
consistent with international practice and how national and international best
practice can be promoted.
As a result of Walker's recommendations, the
role of the Chief Risk Officer may fundamentally change. Walker suggests that
the CRO mandate should encompass all material risks and become, at least in
part, the 'eyes and ears' of the Board Risk Committee.
The
Combined Code and associated guidance
The Combined Code on Corporate
Governance sets out standards of good practice in relation to issues such as
board composition and development, remuneration, accountability and audit and
relations with shareholders.All companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange are required under the Listing Rules to report on how they have applied the Combined Code in their annual report and accounts. The Combined Code contains broad principles and more specific provisions. Listed companies are required to report on how they have applied the main principles of the Code, and either to confirm that they have complied with the Code's provisions or - where they have not - to provide an explanation.
In March 2009 the FRC announced a review of the Combined Code, as a result of which it proposes to make a number of revisions to the Code. Consultation on these proposals ends on 5 March 2010.
Subject to the outcome of consultation it is intended that the revised Code - which will be known as the UK Corporate Governance Code - will apply to financial years beginning on or after 29 June 2010.
Corporate Governance Codes, Best Practice Guidelines
& Reports UK
·
Institute of
Directors, (2001) Standards for the Board – Improving the effectiveness of
your board, London: Kogan Page
·
Committee on
Corporate Governance, Hampel Committee, Final Report (January 1998)
·
Department
for Trade and Industry Report on the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance, Cadbury, (December 1992)
·
Department
for Trade and Industry, Higgs Review on the Role and Effectiveness of
Non-Executive Directors (January 2003)
·
Department
for Trade and Industry, Myners Committee. Developing a Winning Partnership:
How Companies and Institutional Investors are Working Together (1995)
·
Financial
Reporting Council, The Smith Guidance on Audit Committees, (January
2003);
·
Department
for Trade and Industry, The Tyson Report on the Recruitment and Development
of Non-Executive Directors, (June 2003)
·
Hermes
Investment Management Ltd, International Corporate Governance Principles, (December
1999)
·
Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Internal Control Guidance for
Directors on the Combined Code, Turnbull (Sept 1999)
·
London Stock
Exchange, Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best
Practice, (July 2003)
·
Study Group
on Directors’ Remuneration, Final Report (Greenbury Report) (July
1995)
·
The
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Closing the
Communications Gap: Disclosure and Institutional Shareholders (April 1997)
and Audit Committees: A Framework for Assessment (May 1997)
·
Cadbury A
(2002) The Chairman and Corporate Governance, London
·
ICSA A Guide
to Best Practice for Annual General Meetings, London, ICSA
·
ICSA A guide
to the Statement of Compliance, London, ICSA
·
ICSA Duties
of a Company Secretary, London, ICSA
·
ICSA The
Appointment and Induction of Directors, London, ICSA
·
ICAEW,
Internal Control and Financial Reporting, Rutteman Report, 1994
·
CIPFA, The
good governance standard for public services, 2005
·
USA federal law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 2002)
·
Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking
crisis (March 2009)
·
HM Treasury, The Walker Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry
entities (November
2009)
·
Financial
Reporting Council, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December
2009)
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